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 The Effect of Corporate Tax Avoidance on the Cost of
Equity
Abstract
Based on Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007)’s derivation of the cost of
equity capital in terms of expected cash flows, we generate a testable
hypothesis that relates tax avoidance to a firm’s cost of equity capital.
Using  three  broad  measures  of  tax  avoidance—book-tax  differences,
permanent book-tax differences, and long-run cash effective tax rates—to
test  our  hypothesis,  we  find  that  the  cost  of  equity  is  lower  for  tax-
avoiding  firms.  This  effect  is  stronger  for  firms  with  better  outside
monitoring,  firms  that  likely  realize  higher  marginal  benefits  from tax
savings,  and firms with  higher  information  quality.  Overall,  our  results
suggest that equity investors generally require a lower expected rate of
return due to the positive cash flow effects of corporate tax avoidance. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Dyreng,  Hanlon,  and  Maydew  (2008)  document  that  many  U.S.
corporations exhibit  low long-run cash effective tax rates.1 Presumably,
such  persistent  tax  avoidance  must  have  some  beneficial  effects  for
shareholders, which explains why firms provide incentives to executives
to reduce tax burdens (Robinson,  Sikes,  and Weaver 2010;  Armstrong,
Blouin, and Larcker 2012). We analyze the effect of this tax avoidance on
a  firm’s  cost  of  equity.  Following  Dyreng  et  al.  (2008),  we  define  tax
avoidance  broadly to include all  tax planning activities that reduce the
firm’s taxes relative to its pretax accounting income. Consequently, our
empirical  measures  of  tax  avoidance  in  this  study  reflect  both  tax
reductions that are in clear compliance with the law as well as those that
result  from grey-area  interpretations;  our  measures  do  not  specifically
distinguish between the two.2
Our  analysis  adds  to  an  emerging  literature  examining  the
consequences of tax avoidance in the equity capital markets. Hanlon and
Slemrod  (2009)  and  Wilson  (2009)  examine,  respectively,  short-term
equity market reaction and long-term stock returns to the disclosure of
tax shelter activities. However, they do not link their predictions or results
to  the  cost  of  equity.  More  importantly,  tax  shelters  represent  an
1 Dyreng et al. (2008) find that approximately one-fourth of their sample firms are able to
maintain long-run cash effective tax rates below 20 percent, compared to a sample mean
tax rate  of  approximately  30 percent  and the  statutory  tax rate  of  35 percent.  This
suggests that many U.S. firms engage in significant tax planning activities.
2 As highlighted by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, footnote 39), it is difficult to distinguish
between technically legal avoidance and illegal evasion for two reasons. First, most of
the  tax  planning  activities  in  question  involve  transactions  that  are  often technically
legal. Second, the legality of a tax avoidance transaction is often determined after the
fact  in  a  court  of  law,  and  the  permissibility  of  these  transactions  is  almost  always
ambiguous. In our main tests, we specifically utilize broad tax avoidance measures that
are less likely to just capture extreme forms of tax avoidance such as tax sheltering (see
Section III). 
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extremely aggressive and risky form of tax avoidance at one end of the
continuum of tax planning strategies (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), and
are not representative of the tax planning activities that most U.S. firms
engage in. In contemporaneous working papers, Koester (2013) examines
how  investors  value  uncertain  tax  avoidance  captured  in  firms’  tax
reserves and Hutchens and Rego (2015) test the relation between a firm’s
tax reserves and its cost of equity. However, Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew
(2014) argue that uncertain tax avoidance strategies are only a subset of
the overall tax avoidance firms engage in, and firms only turn to uncertain
tax  avoidance  strategies  when  safe  tax  avoidance  strategies  are
exhausted.  By  presenting  large-sample  evidence  on  the  association
between cost of equity and tax avoidance that generate large book-tax
differences, large permanent book-tax differences and low cash effective
tax rates, we are able to examine and draw inferences on whether equity
investors require a higher or lower expected rate of return for tax avoiding
firms.
Applying the Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) derivation of the
cost of capital to our setting, we argue that tax avoidance can affect the
cost of capital via its effect on the firm’s expected future cash flow and its
effect  on  the  variance  of  the  firm’s  own  cash  flows  as  well  as  the
covariance of the firm’s cash flow with the sum of all cash flows in the
market. On the one hand, tax avoidance can result in substantial cash tax-
savings (Dyreng et al. 2008), which increases expected future cash flows
and hence reduces  the  cost  of  equity  capital.  On  the  other  hand,  tax
avoidance could substantially increase the variance and covariances of
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the firm’s cash flows, thereby increasing the cost of equity capital. First,
firm risk  can increase  from the transactions  or  business  fundamentals
underlying these tax strategies such as foreign operations, research and
development activities and investments in intangibles. More aggressive
tax strategies such as transfer pricing may involve complex structuring of
transactions, which can increase the riskiness of the firm’s overall cash
flows. Second, equity holders are exposed to the risk that some of the
firm’s more aggressive tax avoidance activities may not be deemed by
the IRS and the tax courts to be compliant, which could subject the firm to
additional  taxes,  fines,  interest  and  penalties  (Mills  1998;  Hanlon  and
Slemrod 2009).  Finally,  to the extent that there is  a positive feedback
effect between corporate  tax avoidance and managerial  actions  (Desai
and Dharmapala 2006), equity holders are exposed to the agency risk of
managerial rent diversion. Because the possibility of wealth expropriation
increases  the  riskiness  of  the  firm’s  cash  flows  to  shareholders,  tax
avoidance  activities  can  increase  the  variance  and  covariances  of  the
firm’s cash flows. 
Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2014) find that firms with greater tax
avoidance  incur  higher  bank  loan  spreads,  while  Shevlin,  Urcan,  and
Vasvari  (2013)  find  that  firms with  greater  tax  avoidance incur  higher
public bond yield spreads at issuance. These findings are consistent with
debt holders being exposed to the risks of tax avoidance but not sharing
in  the  corresponding  rewards  from tax  savings.  In  our  context,  to  the
extent  that  equity  holders  enjoy  the  upside  potential  of  increased
expected  cash  flows  from  tax  savings  and  this  incremental  benefit
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outweighs the incremental risk exposure due to tax avoidance activities,
we  expect  a  negative  association  between  tax  avoidance  and  cost  of
equity.    
Using a large sample of firms from 1993-2010, we find that higher
levels of book-tax differences (BTD) and permanent book-tax differences
(PBTD), and lower levels of long-run cash effective tax rates (CETR) are
associated with a lower cost of equity capital. We measure the  ex-ante
cost  of  equity  based on  current  stock  prices  and  analysts’  forecast  of
future earnings (Easton 2004; Botosan and Plumlee 2005).  This result is
robust to using a change specification, using three alternative measures
of  cost  of  equity,  using  beta  to  proxy  for  equity  risk,  using  earnings
forecasts from a cross-sectional earnings model so as to avoid error in
estimates  of  cost  of  equity  arising  from  biased  analyst  forecasts,
estimating the cost of equity based on expected returns from the Fama-
French  factor  model,  and  using  three  alternative  measures  of  tax
avoidance (GAAP effective tax rate, Zimmerman (1983) current effective
tax rate and the one-year measure of cash effective tax rate). The effect
of tax avoidance on the cost of equity is also economically significant. A
one  standard  deviation  increase  in  our  measures  of  tax  avoidance  is
associated with a 13 to 26 basis points reduction in the cost of equity,
even  after  controlling  for  an  extensive  list  of  risk  factors  that  are
documented in the prior literature to be associated with cost of equity as
well  as  controlling  for  the  business  fundamentals  underlying  these tax
saving  transactions.3 Overall,  our  results  suggest  that  equity  investors
3 Following prior studies such as Hasan et al. (2014), we assess the economic significance
of  our  results  by  estimating  the  effect  of  a  one  standard  deviation  change  in  tax
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require  a  lower  expected rate  of  return  due to  the  positive  cash  flow
effects of corporate tax avoidance.
To  corroborate  our  findings,  we  further  investigate  whether  the
negative  association  between  tax  avoidance  and  cost  of  equity  is
moderated by outside monitoring, the marginal benefits of tax savings,
and information quality. We expect the negative association between tax
avoidance and cost of equity to be stronger for firms with better outside
monitoring  because  effective  monitoring  can  reduce  managerial
opportunism and mitigate agency risks associated with tax avoidance. In
addition, we expect the negative association between tax avoidance and
cost of equity to be stronger for firms with greater financial constraints
and better growth opportunities because the marginal benefit of cash tax
savings to firms in these circumstances are higher.4 Finally, to the extent
that higher information quality enhances investors’ ability to assess firms’
expected values and the uncertainty of future cash flows and facilitates
outside  monitoring  (Lambert  et  al.  2007),  we  expect  the  negative
association between tax avoidance and cost of equity to be stronger for
firms with higher information quality. The cross-sectional results are all
consistent with our expectations. 
Our final analysis examines the relation between cost of equity and
a firm’s likelihood of engaging in tax shelter activities, proxied by the tax
avoidance on the cost of equity. We acknowledge that a one standard deviation increase
in  our  measures  of  tax  avoidance  appears  economically  large,  and  that  it  seems
implausible for a firm to increase tax avoidance by that economic magnitude in order to
reduce the cost of equity. In other words, we are not able to observe the counter-factual. 
4 Edwards,  Schwab,  and  Shevlin  (2015)  find  that  firms  facing  financial  constraints
undertake more tax avoidance in order to save tax cash outflows. Consequently, these
cash flows could be employed to satisfy working capital  needs and to fund profitable
investment opportunities.
5
shelter  prediction  score  in  Lisowsky  (2010),  and  the  predicted
unrecognized  tax  benefit  (UTB)  in  Lisowsky,  Robinson,  and  Schmidt
(2013). We conjecture that when a firm engages in aggressive and risky
forms of tax avoidance such as tax shelter activities, the increase in the
variance and covariances of the firm’s cash flows could, on a net basis,
outweigh  the  increase  in  the  firm’s  expected  future  cash  flows  from
avoiding  taxes.5 We  find  a  significantly  positive  relation  (no  relation)
between predicted UTB (tax shelter prediction score) and cost of equity. 
Our finding that broad measures of tax avoidance are associated
with lower cost of equity do not mean that tax avoidance is a “no lose”
situation in which all firms should participate aggressively. Consistent with
the Scholes-Wolfson framework, effective tax planning/avoidance does not
equate  to  or  imply  a  tax  minimization  strategy.  Effective  tax  planning
involves evaluating not only the benefits in tax savings, but also the non-
tax costs, implicit taxes and effects on other parties to the extent these
affect the terms of trade.6 Existing literature documents significant cross-
5 For  instance,  tax  shelter  activities  can  lead  to  greater  complexity  in  the  firm’s
transactions and operations, further increasing the variance and covariances of the firm’s
overall  cash  flows.  Tax  shelter  activities  also  have  a  greater  likelihood  of  being
disallowed by IRS (which can subject the firms to more taxes and fines) and diversion of
corporate resources for managers’ private benefits, both of which can reduce the firm’s
expected cash flows accruing to shareholders and increase the riskiness of the firm’s
cash flows. 
6 For instance, firms have to invest substantial resources in the form of fees paid to tax
accountants  and  attorneys,  as  well  as  the  time  that  managers  and their  employees
devote  to  tax  planning and  resolving  audits  with tax  authorities.  Costs  can  increase
significantly if tax authorities are successful in challenging an aggressive tax position.
Further, Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff (2014) highlight potential reputation costs
associated with corporate tax avoidance. Their survey documents that the potential for
an  adverse  effect  on  company  reputation  significantly  constrains  firms’  incentives  to
engage in tax planning strategies, with 69 percent of their survey respondents, including
72  percent  of  publicly  traded  respondents,  indicating  that  reputation  concerns  are
‘important’ or ‘very important.’ Other studies document that tax avoidance increases the
firm’s cost of debt (e.g., Hasan et al. 2014; Shevlin et al. 2013). Finally, there are also
costs associated with corporate tax avoidance activities such as potential  managerial
rent diversion and agency problems (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006).
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sectional variation in corporate tax avoidance due to the cross-sectional
variation in the costs and benefits of tax avoidance activities. Our cross-
sectional  results  also  suggest  cross-firm  variation  in  the  costs  and
benefits.
Our  study  makes  several  contributions  to  the  existing  literature.
First,  it  extends  the  literature  on  how  investors  value  corporate  tax
avoidance behavior. While prior studies examine how investors value tax
sheltering  and  uncertain  tax  avoidance,  the  results  are  inconclusive
(Hanlon  and  Slemrod  2009;  Wilson  2009;  Koester  2013;  Gallemore,
Maydew, and Thornock 2014; Hutchens and Rego 2015) and there is little
evidence  on  how  investors  view  tax  avoidance  in  general.  Desai  and
Dharmapala (2009) and De Simone and Stomberg (2013) both examine
the relation between broad measures of tax avoidance and firm value, but
these studies do not directly investigate how tax avoidance is associated
with a firm’s cost of  equity.7 Our study complements  these studies by
using a large sample of firms to examine how broadly defined measures
of tax avoidance, which include the less aggressive tax planning methods,
are associated with a firm’s cost of equity. 
Second, our study adds to the debate on the corporate governance
view of tax avoidance. While Desai  and Dharmapala (2006) and Desai,
Dyck, and Zingales (2007) argue that aggressive tax avoidance increases
financial  opacity  and  facilitates  managerial  rent  extraction,  Blaylock
7 Desai and Dharmapala (2009) use book-tax differences adjusted for accruals as a proxy
for  tax  avoidance,  and  they  find  no  significant  relation  between  their  proxy  for  tax
avoidance and Tobin’s q, and only a positive relation between tax avoidance and Tobin’s
q in firms with high levels of institutional ownership. De Simone and Stomberg (2013)
document a positive association between low cash ETRs and Tobin’s q, and that this
effect is stronger for firms whose mobile income and asset structures afford them greater
opportunities to engage in long-term, sustainable tax avoidance.
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(2015) fails to find evidence to support this contention. In fact, using a
large  panel  of  U.S.  firms,  he  finds  that  tax  avoidance  is  positively
associated  with  future  firm  performance  and  with  a  more  optimal
investment policy, even among poorly governed firms. Our main findings
of a negative association between broad measures of tax avoidance and
the cost of equity also suggest that the agency risks associated with tax
avoidance activities do not outweigh the benefits of increased expected
cash flows from tax savings. However, our cross-sectional results suggest
that  relative  to  well  governed  firms,  weakly  governed  firms  do  face
increased cost of equity presumably due to such risks. Nonetheless, our
results suggest that corporate tax avoidance is desirable from investors’
perspective,  which  potentially  explains  why  many  U.S.  corporations
provide incentives to maangers to reduce tax burdens (Robinson et al.
2010;  Armstrong et al.  2012).  If  tax avoidance behavior  is  undesirable
from the shareholders’ viewpoint, it is difficult to reconcile the prevalence
of tax planning in U.S. corporations despite the relatively strong corporate
governance and legal environment in the U.S. 
Next,  Section  II  discusses  the  findings  in  related  literature  and
develops our hypotheses. Section III describes the data and our research
methodology. We present and discuss the results in Section IV.  Section V
reports additional analyses and sensitivity tests and Section VI concludes.
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The Association between Tax Avoidance and the Cost of Equity
Capital
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To develop testable hypotheses relating tax avoidance to the cost of
equity, we rely on the cost of capital derivation by Lambert et al. (2007),
who develop a model in a single-period multi-security CAPM setting that
expresses the cost of equity, given the information available to market
participantsΦ, as follows (their equation 4b):
E (~R j|Φ )=
Rf H (Φ )+1
H (Φ)−1 ,where H (Φ)=
E (~V j∨Φ)
1
Nτ Cov ¿¿
From this expression, the cost of equity for a firm is affected by the: 1)
risk-free  rate  Rf ;  2)  aggregate  market  risk  tolerance  Nτ;  3)  expected
future cash flow E (~V j) and; 4) covariance of the firm’s cash flow with the
sum of all firms’ cash flows in the market Cov ¿, which is increasing in the
riskiness of the firm’s cash flow. The expected future cash flow affecting
the  cost  of  equity  capital  in  the  Lambert  et  al.  (2007)  model  is
counterintuitive if one thinks of expected cash flows as the numerator in a
discounted cash flow valuation model. Lambert et al. (2007, 392) clarify
this relationship as follows: “Perhaps the most surprising result is that an
increase in the expected value of cash flows decreases the expected rate
of return. The intuition, however, is fairly straightforward. Consider a firm
with  two  components  of  cash  flow:  a  riskless  component  and  a  risky
component.  Clearly  the  cost  of  capital  for  the  firm  is  somewhere  in
between the cost of capital for the riskless component and the cost of
capital  for  the  risky  component.  But  if  the  firm’s  expected  cash  flow
increases  without  affecting  the  firm’s  variances  or  covariances,  this  is
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exactly analogous to adding a new riskless component of cash flow to the
firm’s existing cash flow. The firm’s cost of capital therefore decreases.”8,9
While Lambert et al. (2007) apply the model to analyze the effect of
information quality on a firm’s expected returns or risk, the derivation of
the cost of capital in terms of expected cash flows can also be used to
analyze any firm’s action that has cash flow effects. They state, “There is
nothing in Proposition 1 that is  specific to accounting information.  Any
shock – new regulations, taxes, inventions, et cetera – that affects the H
term has a corresponding effect on the firm’s expected returns (Lambert
et al. 2007, 394).” Applying the Lambert et al. (2007) derivation of the
cost of capital to our setting, we argue that tax avoidance can affect the
cost of capital via its effect on the firm’s expected future cash flow and its
effect  on  the  variance  of  the  firm’s  own  cash  flows  as  well  as  the
covariance with other firms’ cash flows.  The most obvious benefit of tax
planning  is  cash  tax-savings.  Extending  the  logic  of  equation  (1),  this
benefit of tax avoidance can be interpreted as cash flow appropriated by
8 As  highlighted  by  Lambert  et  al.  (2007,  390),  because  the  CAPM  formulation  is
expressed solely in terms of  covariances,  this  may imply that  other factors  (such as
expected cash flow), do not directly affect the firm’s cost of capital. Lambert et al. (2007)
stress that the covariance term in the CAPM is expressed in terms of returns,  not in
terms of cash flows. Returns and cash flows are related as follows:
Cov (~R j ,~Rm )=Cov(
~V j
P j
,
~V m
Pm )= 1P j Pm Cov (~V j ,~V m)
where  ~V j and  
~Vm refer to the cash flow at the end of the period for the firm and the
market portfolio, and P j and Pm refer to the price at the beginning of the period for the
firm and the market portfolio. Clearly, the current stock price of the firm P j is a function
of the firm’s future cash flow, and this is demonstrated in Fama (1976, Eq.83) where the
current  stock price of  the firm is expressed as the expected end-of-period cash flow
minus a reduction for risk.
9 Lambert et al. (2007) provide this simple example based on ceteris paribus conditions
to illustrate that an additional riskless cash flow component can result in a lower cost of
capital.  Conceptually,  it  is not necessary that the additional  cash flow component be
riskless in order to result in a lower cost of capital. All it requires is for the additional cash
flow component to result in a higher H(Φ) to lead to an overall decrease in the cost of
capital as in Equation (1).
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the  firm  from  the  tax  authorities,  and  therefore  this  appropriation  is
predicted to increase expected cash flows and thus reduce the firm’s cost
of equity. The cash savings from tax avoidance can be substantial. For
instance, Mills,  Erickson, and Maydew (1998) find that an additional $1
investment  in  tax  planning  results  in  a  $4  reduction  in  tax  liabilities.
Dyreng et al. (2008) find that approximately one-fourth of their sample
firms are able  to  maintain  long run cash effective tax  rates  below 20
percent,  compared  to  a  sample  mean  tax  rate  of  approximately  30
percent and the statutory tax rate of 35 percent.
However,  it  is  important  to  note  this  prediction  that  tax  savings
reduce the firm’s cost of equity is based on ceteris paribus conditions. In
Equation  (1),  an  increase  in  expected  cash  flows  from  tax  avoidance
activities could also increase the variance and covariances of the firm’s
cash flows and thus the firm’s cost of equity capital. First, firm risk can
increase from the transactions or business fundamentals underlying these
tax  strategies  such  as  foreign  operations,  research  and  development
activities  and  investments  in  intangibles.  While  tax  strategies  such  as
municipal bond investments may increase after-tax cash flows with little
or no increase in variance and covariances of cash flows, more aggressive
strategies  such as transfer  pricing or  using foreign tax havens involve
complex  structuring  of  transactions  to  minimize  overall  tax  burdens.
These strategies can increase the riskiness and hence the variance and
covariances of the firm’s overall cash flows. For example, Balakrishnan,
Blouin,  and  Guay  (2013)  discuss  the  case  of  Google  and  Forest
Laboratories in which tax planning strategies can alter the capital flows
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within a firm. The authors argue that these circuitous flows and separation
of business activities make it more difficult for outsiders to interpret the
source and persistence of the firm’s earnings and cash flows. 
Second, as firms get progressively more aggressive in reducing their
tax  liabilities,  they  are  more  likely  to  stretch  the  limits  of  legal
interpretations  of  tax laws (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010)  and are more
likely to be audited by the IRS (Mills 1998). To the extent that some of the
firm’s aggressive tax avoidance activities are deemed by the IRS and the
tax courts to be noncompliant, they may be disallowed and the firm could
be subject to additional taxes, fines, interest and penalties (Mills  1998;
Hanlon and Slemrod 2009). For example, GlaxoSmithKline P.L.C. settled
with the IRS with a $3.4 billion payment for transfer pricing practices that
seek to avoid taxes. This can lead equity holders to anticipate greater
uncertainty in the firm’s future after-tax cash flow and thus the variance
and covariances of cash flows increase. 
Finally, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that complementarities
exist between tax sheltering and rent extraction activities. They discuss
the example  of  Dynegy in  which tax sheltering activities  can facilitate
managerial  misrepresentation and destroy shareholder value. They find
that  better  manager-shareholder  incentive  alignment  via  higher  stock-
based  compensation  is  associated  with  lower  tax  avoidance,  and  the
negative  association  between  firm  value  and  tax  avoidance  is  driven
primarily  by firms with weaker governance. The authors  interpret  their
evidence  as  consistent  with  agency  costs  diminishing  the  benefits  of
corporate tax avoidance to shareholders. Consistent with this agency view
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of tax avoidance, Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) find that family
firms have lower  levels  of  tax  avoidance,  which  is  consistent  with  the
notion that family owners are willing to forgo tax benefits to avoid the
non-tax cost of a potential stock price discount. The discount could arise
from  minority  shareholders’  concern  with  rent-seeking  masked  by  tax
avoidance activities. This possibility of wealth expropriation increases the
riskiness of the firm’s cash flows to shareholders, and hence the variance
and covariances of the firm’s cash flows.10  
In sum, while tax avoidance increases expected after-tax cash flows,
it can also affect the variance and covariances of the firm’s cash flows.
Hasan et al. (2014) find that firms with greater tax avoidance incur higher
bank loan spreads, while Shevlin et al. (2013) find that firms with greater
tax  avoidance  incur  higher  public  bond  yield  spreads  at  issuance.
However, it is important to note that debt holders and equity holders have
significantly  different  risk  preferences  and  return  expectations.  Unlike
equity  holders,  debt  holders  such  as  banks  and  bondholders  have
asymmetric  payoffs.  They generally  receive  a  fixed future  income and
face  substantial  downside  risk.  Although  tax  savings  might  accrue  to
equity holders, they do not necessarily benefit debt holders who are fixed
claimants. The results in Hasan et al. (2014) and Shevlin et al. (2013) are
consistent with debt holders being exposed to the risks of tax avoidance
but  not  sharing in  the corresponding rewards from tax savings.  In  our
context,  to  the  extent  that  shareholders  enjoy  the  benefits  of  the
10 Managerial rent diversion can also reduce the expected after-tax cash flow accruing to
shareholders, which the Lambert et al. (2007) model predicts should increase the cost of
equity.
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substantial tax savings from tax avoidance activities and this incremental
benefit  outweighs  the  incremental  risk  exposure  due to  tax  avoidance
activities, we expect a negative association between tax avoidance and
cost of equity. Hence, we present our hypothesis in alternative form:
H1:  Ceteris  paribus,  the  cost  of  equity  capital  is  negatively
associated with firms’ tax avoidance.
Notwithstanding the above arguments, it is important to note that
Sikes and Verrecchia (2014) show in their theoretical model that when a
meaningful proportion of firms in an economy engage in tax avoidance
strategies, the covariance between a firm’s cash flow and the market cash
flows  increases,  thereby  increasing a  firm’s  cost  of  capital.  In  our
hypothesis  development,  we  assume  that  the  increase  in  the  firm’s
expected future cash flows from tax avoidance outweighs the increase in
the variance and covariances of the firm’s cash flows and hence results in
a lower cost of equity on a net basis. To the extent that this assumption is
incorrect,  we might  observe no relation  or  even a  positive  association
between tax avoidance and cost of equity capital. Therefore, whether we
find results consistent with H1 is an empirical question.11
Cross-sectional Predictions
Effect of Outside Monitoring
Our earlier discussion predicts that tax avoidance can reduce the
cost of equity via the effects of increased expected future cash flows from
11 Sikes  and  Verrecchia’s  (2014)  model  assumes  that  firms’  pre-tax  cash  flows  are
independent of their tax avoidance strategies;  however,  firms’ pre-tax cash flows are
potentially dependent on how the dollars saved from paying tax can be redeployed to
more  productive  uses.  As  acknowledged  by  the  authors,  relaxing  the  independence
assumption leaves open the possibility that tax avoidance can be negatively associated
with the cost of equity capital.
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cash tax-savings.  However,  the agency problems embedded within  tax
avoidance  activities  (Desai  and  Dharmapala  2006)  can  increase
managerial  diversion  of  corporate  resources,  which  can  decrease  the
expected cash flows accruing to shareholders and increasing the variance
and covariances of  cash flows. We predict  that outside monitoring can
reduce  the  diversion  of  tax  savings  by  managers  for  their  private
consumption or the likelihood that tax avoidance activities are being used
to mask managerial rent extraction. Consistent with this reasoning, Chen
et  al.  (2010)  find  that  tax  avoidance  in  family  firms  is  increasing  in
effective  outside  monitoring,  presumably  because  effective  outside
monitoring mitigates managerial rent extraction and reduces the concern
with family firms extracting rents through tax avoidance activities. Desai
et al. (2007) also find that increases in corporate tax rates are associated
with  increases  in  corporate  tax  revenue  only  in  countries  with  strong
governance, suggesting that managers are able to divert less with more
effective  outside  monitoring.  Therefore,  we  predict  that  outside
monitoring can reduce the diversion of tax savings by managers for their
private consumption or the risk that tax avoidance activities are being
used  to  mask  managerial  rent  extraction.12 Our  first  cross-sectional
hypothesis is:
12 Armstrong,  Blouin,  Jagolinzer,  and  Larcker  (2015)  presents  an  alternative  agency-
theoretic view that tax avoidance is one of many risky investment opportunities available
to management. Similar to other investment decisions, unresolved agency problems can
lead managers to select a level of tax avoidance that differs from what shareholders
would  prefer.  The  authors  argue  that  tax  avoidance  does  not  necessarily  result  in
opportunities  for  managerial  diversion  but  as  with  other  agency  problems,  various
governance  mechanisms  in  place  can mitigate  over-  and under-investment  problems
with respect to tax avoidance. To the extent that outside monitoring mitigates under-
investment in tax avoidance, we expect investors to view tax avoidance more positively
for firms with better outside monitoring, consistent with the alternative agency-theoretic
view proposed by Armstrong et al. (2015).
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H2a:  Ceteris  paribus,  the  negative  association  between  firms’  tax
avoidance  and  the  cost  of  equity  capital,  as  hypothesized  in  H1,  is
stronger for firms that have better outside monitoring.
Effect of Marginal Benefits from Tax Savings
Earlier, we argue that tax avoidance can reduce the cost of equity
through the increased expected future cash flows from tax savings. The
strength of this “cash-flow effect” likely depends on the marginal benefit
of tax avoidance to the firm and the use of the marginal dollar saved from
paying taxes. Firms with financial constraints face difficulty in obtaining
sufficient  financing  to  fund  investments  when  profitable  opportunities
arise. The cash savings from tax avoidance can be utilized to fund these
investments  that  would  otherwise  be  foregone.  As  such,  the  marginal
benefit  of  a  dollar  of  tax  saved is  likely  to  be  higher  for  these firms.
Consistent with this  reasoning,  Denis  and Sibilkov  (2010)  find that  the
value of cash holdings is higher for financially constrained firms because it
allows them to increase investment. Edwards et al. (2015) also find that
an  increase  in  financial  constraints  leads  firms  to  increase  internally-
generated funds via tax planning, because  the marginal benefits of tax
avoidance is  greater  when firms are more financially  constrained.  In  a
similar vein, firms with higher sales growth are likely to benefit more from
the marginal dollar saved from paying less tax as it allows them to fund
their growth opportunities. Therefore, to the extent that the benefits of
tax avoidance in the form of increased expected future cash flows from
tax savings are greater  for  firms  with greater financial  constraints  and
growth  opportunities,  we expect  the  negative  association  between tax
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avoidance and the cost of equity to be stronger for these firms. Our next
cross-sectional hypothesis is: 
H2b:  Ceteris  paribus,  the  negative  association  between  firms’  tax
avoidance  and  the  cost  of  equity  capital,  as  hypothesized  in  H1,  is
stronger for firms with higher marginal benefits from tax savings.
Effect of Information Quality
Prior studies suggest that information quality enhances investors’
ability  to assess firms’ expected values and uncertainty of  future cash
flows (e.g.,  Lambert et al.  2007).  Therefore,  we expect investors to be
better able to assess the benefits and uncertainty behind tax planning
activities when information quality is high.13 Also, to the extent that higher
information  quality  facilitates  monitoring  by  outsiders  (Lambert  et  al.
2007),  agency  problems  can  be  mitigated  and  the  likelihood  of
misappropriation  by  managers  declines.  Accordingly,  we  expect  the
negative  association  between  tax  avoidance  and  cost  of  equity  to  be
stronger for firms with higher information quality. Our final cross-sectional
hypothesis is:
H2c:  Ceteris  paribus,  the  negative  association  between  firms’  tax
avoidance  and  the  cost  of  equity  capital,  as  hypothesized  in  H1,  is
stronger for firms with higher information quality. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
13 Our prediction does not rely on there being an association between tax avoidance and
information quality although such an association might exist but the sign is debatable.
On one hand, Gallemore and Labro (2015) argue that tax avoidance and high quality
internal  information  environment  go  hand  in  hand,  and  they  document  a  positive
association  between  tax  avoidance  and  proxies  for  the  firm’s  internal  information
environment. On the other hand, Frank et al. (2009) find that tax avoidance is associated
with  financial  reporting  aggressiveness,  which  presumably  increases  opacity,  and
Balakrishnan et al.  (2013) report that tax avoidance increases the opacity of a firm’s
information environment. 
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Measures of Tax Avoidance
Because we want to capture a broad spectrum of tax avoidance, we
focus on book-tax differences, permanent book-tax differences, and long-
run  cash  effective  tax  rates,  which  Lisowsky  et  al.  (2013)  propose  as
measures that capture the less aggressive and risky form of tax avoidance
activities. Our first measure, book-tax differences (BTD), is defined as the
total difference between book and taxable income:
 BTD = PI – (TXFED + TXFO)/STR
where  PI  refers  to  pretax  income,  TXFED refers  to  current  federal  tax
expense, TXFO refers to current foreign tax expense and STR refers to the
statutory tax rate. For cross-sectional aggregation purposes, BTD is scaled
by lagged total assets.14
BTDs capture both permanent differences (e.g., book income that is
non-taxable such as tax credits) as well as temporary differences, such as
favorable tax treatment for depreciation that defers taxation until future
periods. Prior literature is divided with respect to whether permanent or
temporary differences better capture tax avoidance behavior (e.g., Hanlon
and  Heitzman  2010).  Thus,  we  utilize  permanent  book-tax  difference
(PBTD) as our second measure for tax avoidance.  PBTD is computed as
total  book-tax  differences  (BTD)  less  temporary  book-tax-differences
(TXDI/STR), where TXDI is total deferred tax expense. Our third measure is
14 Our treatment of missing variables for TXFO and TXFED follows Frank, Lynch, and Rego
(2009, footnote 9). In particular, if TXFO is missing, we set it to zero. If TXFED is missing,
we set it equal to total tax expense (TXT) less the sum of current foreign tax expense
(TXFO) plus current state tax expense (TXS) plus deferred tax expense (TXDI).
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the long-run cash effective tax rate (CETR), which we define similarly to
Dyreng et al. (2008):15
CETR = -1  × [Five-year sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD)/(five-year sum of
pretax income (PI) less special items (SPI))]
Using an effective tax rate measure over a five-year horizon avoids annual
volatility  in  effective  tax  rates,  and mitigates  concerns  about  earnings
management through accruals because accruals are likely to reverse over
the long run. Using a cash-based effective tax rate measure also avoids
tax accrual effects present in the current tax expense. We multiply the
five-year cash-based effective tax rate by negative one so that all three
measures are increasing in tax avoidance.
Measure of Cost of Equity Capital
Following prior studies, our measure of ex-ante cost of equity capital
is based on the discount rate that the market applies to a firm’s future
cash flow to determine the current stock price (e.g., Easton 2004; Botosan
and  Plumlee  2005;  Easton  and  Monahan  2005).  Because  we  cannot
directly observe the market’s expectation of a firm’s future cash flow, we
rely on analysts’ expectations of future earnings as a proxy for market’s
expectations. Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and Botosan, Plumlee, and Wen
15 In calculating  CETR,  we first  require the denominator,  five-year cumulative pre-tax
income less special items, to be positive following the extant literature (e.g., Dyreng et
al. 2008). Our results are robust to including special items in our measurement of five-
year cumulative pre-tax income. In our full sample of firm-year observations with non-
missing control variables for our main analyses, we drop 1) 11.6 percent of the sample
for incomplete five years of data due to missing cash tax paid; and 2) 5.1 percent of the
sample for cumulative losses over five years. We truncate CETR to lie between zero and
one  resulting  in  a  further  reduction  of  3.8  percent  of  the  sample.   In  an  additional
robustness test, we use an alternative measure of tax avoidance proposed by Henry and
Sansing (2014) that addresses the CETR data truncation bias. Our results are robust to
this alternative measure (results available upon request). Note that our other measures
of tax avoidance (e.g., BTD and PBTD) do not require firms to be profitable in order to be
included in our sample.
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(2011) review a number of valuation models to derive the implied cost of
equity. The models differ in their assumption of short-term and long-term
growth  rates,  the  explicit  forecasting  horizon  and  whether  and  how
inflation is  incorporated into the steady-state terminal  value.  Our main
measure  is  based  on  Easton  (2004),  where  the  cost  of  equity  capital
(labeled R_PEG by Easton) is defined as:
RPEG=√eps2−eps1P0
where eps2 (eps1) refers to analysts’ forecast of two-year (one-year) ahead
earnings and P0 refers to current stock price.16
We choose  this  measure  for  two  important  reasons.  First,  using
Value Line analysts forecast data, Botosan and Plumlee (2005) suggest
that this measure performs well as a proxy of cost of equity relative to
other measures used in prior literature.17 Second, this measure imposes
minimal  data restriction  and does not  require  an estimate of  analysts’
forecasts of long-term earnings and stock price. Therefore, it allows us to
conduct a large-sample study using I/B/E/S consensus analyst forecasts
data as compared to using a much smaller restricted sample using Value
Line data.  In sensitivity tests, we follow Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and
test our main hypotheses using two alternative measures on a smaller
sample based on Value Line data. We also use a number of alternative
16 This measure restricts our sample to firms where eps2 is greater than eps1. We conduct
additional  robustness  tests  using  alternative  measures  of  cost  of  equity  that  do  not
require forecasted EPS and EPS growth to be positive,  such as  VL_DIV based on the
dividend discount model, BETA and expected returns from the Fama-French factor model
(see Section V).
17 In particular, Botosan and Plumlee (2005) find that  R_PEG is associated with various
proxies for firm-risk and is stable across alternative specifications.
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measures of  cost of  equity,  and we find that our results  are robust to
using these alternative measures (see Section V). 
Empirical Models
Main Analysis
To test H1, we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional 
regression:
R_PEGit+1 = α + βTAXit + ψFIRM_CONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit
            (2),
where R_PEG refers to the measure of cost of equity capital, TAX refers to
the measure  of  tax  avoidance (BTD,  PBTD,  or  CETR),  FIRM_CONTROLS
refers to a vector of firm-level controls and YEAR_FE and IND_FE refer to
time and industry fixed-effects, respectively. We measure R_PEG at time
t+1 to ensure that investors have access to information relating to the
firm’s  tax  avoidance  activities  before  determining  their  expected
returns.18 The  control  variables  are  measured  contemporaneously  with
TAX. Because we conduct our hypothesis testing on a pooled sample, we
cluster the standard errors by firm and include time and industry fixed-
effects in our regressions (Petersen 2009). Table 1 includes the detailed
definition of all variables. 
We select our first set of  FIRM_CONTROLS that are documented in
prior literature to be associated with the cost of equity capital (e.g., Fama
and  French  1992,  1993;  Botosan  and  Plumlee  2005;  Armstrong,  Core,
18 In particular, we utilize inputs from the first consensus analyst forecast from I/B/E/S
four months after fiscal year end at time t to estimate the cost of equity at time t+1 to
ensure that investors have access to information relating to the firm’s tax avoidance
activities at time t before determining their expected returns at time t+1. Our results are
robust to using the average cost of equity computed from inputs of monthly consensus
estimates in time t+1. 
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Taylor, and Verrecchia 2011). We include historical beta (BETA) because
standard capital asset pricing models view beta as the sole determinant of
the cost of equity capital. Firm size (SIZE) and book-to-market ratio (BM)
are included to control for the empirical measurement error in BETA. We
use the leverage ratio (LEV) to control for firm’s capital structure, and bid-
ask  spread  (SPREAD)  to  control  for  information  asymmetry  that  is
associated with the cost of capital. We include stock returns (RET), stock
returns  volatility  ((RETVOL)),  accounting  performance  (EBITDA)  and
accounting performance volatility  ((EBITDA))  to control  for momentum
effects and idiosyncratic risks that are known to affect the cost of equity.19
We include analyst forecast bias (FCBIAS) as a control because optimism
in analyst forecast may affect our estimate of cost of capital. Finally, we
include  accruals  quality  (AQ),  multiplied  by  negative  one  so  that  it  is
increasing in information quality, as an additional control because prior
works document a relationship between accruals quality and the cost of
capital (e.g., Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2005; Shevlin 2013).
We expect  negative  associations  between cost  of  equity  and size  and
accruals quality (SIZE and AQ), and between cost of equity and stock and
accounting  performance  (RET and  EBITDA).  We  expect  positive
associations between cost of equity and other risk factors (BETA, BM, LEV,
SPREAD, (RETVOL)), (EBITDA), and FCBIAS). 
19 We use EBITDA instead of pre-tax income to proxy for accounting performance to avoid
any mechanical relationship between pre-tax income and our measures of tax avoidance
that are based on book-tax difference. In general, book-tax difference is defined as pre-
tax  book  income  minus  estimated  taxable  income.  Therefore,  if  we  include  pre-tax
income as a control variable, we are essentially partialling out the book income from the
book-tax difference, and hence the coefficient on book-tax difference essentially captures
the coefficient on the negative of taxable income, which is not our construct of interest
(i.e., tax avoidance). Our results are also robust to using cash flow from operations as an
alternative measure for accounting performance.
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The  tax  savings  can  arise  from  the  transactions  or  business
fundamentals of the firm – foreign operations, intangibles, equity income
from other firms, depreciation timing differences, etc. To the extent that
firm fundamentals associated with tax planning also affect a firm’s cost of
equity, then our finding of an association between tax avoidance and cost
of equity may be spurious. Hence, for our second set of FIRM_CONTROLS,
we  include  capital  expenditures  (CAPEX),  research  and  development
expenditures (R&D), selling and general administrative expenses (SGA),
foreign operations (FOREIGN), tax losses carry-forwards (TLCF) and excess
tax  benefit  of  stock  options  (TXBCO)  to  control  for  the   business
fundamentals of the firm underlying these tax strategies. Therefore, any
remaining relation between tax avoidance and the cost of equity that we
document will be incremental to these firm fundamental variables.
Cross-sectional Analyses
To  test  H2,  we  modify  equation  (2)  to  include  the  moderating
variable  (Moderating_VAR)  and  the  interaction  between  TAX and
Moderating_VAR:
R_PEGit+1 = α + βTAXit + ψFIRM_CONTROLSit + γModerating_VARit 
+ ηTAXit × Moderating_VARit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit
             (3)
In H2a, we examine the moderating effect of outside monitoring on
the relation between tax avoidance and cost of equity. We measure the
extent of outside monitoring using two proxies. The first proxy is analyst
following (ANALYST) because prior work suggests that analysts serve as
external  monitors  to  the  firm  and  provide  additional  scrutiny  over
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managers’ actions (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976). Yu (2008) finds that
firms  followed  by  more  analysts  are  associated  with  lower  earnings
management.  Dyck,  Morse,  and  Zingales  (2010)  also  document  that
analysts play a role in detecting corporate fraud. Therefore,  we expect
firms  with  greater  analysts  following  to  have  more  effective  outside
monitoring.  The  second  proxy  is  the  percentage  of  shares  held  by
dedicated institutional investors (DEDHELD), where dedicated institutional
investors are defined according to Bushee (1998) and as used in Atkins,
Ng, and Verdi  (2012).20 Prior work suggests that dedicated institutional
investors are long-term oriented, often hold large stakes in the firm and
hence are likely to be more effective monitors (e.g. Bushee 1998; Chen,
Hartford,  and  Li  2007).  Therefore,  we  expect  firms  with  a  greater
percentage of shares held by dedicated institutions to have more effective
outside  monitoring.21 Based  on  H2a,  we  expect  η  to  be  negative  in
equation (3).
In H2b, we examine the moderating effect of marginal benefits from
tax savings on the relation between tax avoidance and cost of equity. We
estimate the marginal benefits from tax savings using two proxies. The
first proxy is sales growth (SG), and we expect firms with greater sales
growth to enjoy greater marginal benefits from tax savings because the
cash saved from taxes can be used to fund growth opportunities.  The
second proxy is a measure of financial constraints based on the Whited-
20 We thank the authors for sharing the data on institutional classification with us.
21 We select these two measures out of many other measures of corporate governance
because these two measures are widely used in the extant literature (e.g. Yu 2008; Chen
et al. 2010), and these two measures result in the least sample restriction. Using other
governance measures (e.g. board independence where data are available only for S&P
1500 firms, and board financial expertise is only available from 2007 onwards) would
substantially reduce our sample size and limit the generalizability of our findings. 
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Wu index (DWW), which is based on a standard intertemporal investment
model  augmented  to  account  for  financial  frictions  (Whited  and  Wu
2006).22  We  expect  firms  with  greater  financial  constraints  to  enjoy
greater marginal benefits from tax savings because the cash saved from
taxes can be utilized to relieve financial constraints and to fund profitable
investment opportunities. Based on H2b, we expect η to be negative in
equation (3).
Finally, H2c examines the moderating effect of information quality
on the relation between tax avoidance and cost of equity. We measure
the quality of  information environment using three measures.  The first
measure is accrual quality (AQ) based on Dechow and Dichev (2002).23
This  measure  captures  the  quality  of  the  accruals  estimation  process,
which could be affected by the firm’s underlying economic determinants,
the  measurement  error  in  the  accounting  system  and/or  earnings
management.  This  variable  is  multiplied  by  negative  one  so  that  it  is
increasing in  information  quality.  We also  utilize  two other  proxies  for
information  quality  following  Gallemore  and Labro  (2015):  1)  speed of
earnings  announcement  (EASPEED)  and;  2)  management  forecast
accuracy (MFACC).24 Jennings, Seo, and Tanlu (2014) argue that a high-
22 Our  inferences  are  unchanged  when  we  use  an  alternative  measure  of  financial
constraints following Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001), which is constructed based
on the results in Kaplan and Zingales (1997). In particular, the coefficient of interest is
statistically significant when we examine  BTD and  PBTD, while it retains the expected
sign but loses significance when we examine CETR as a measure of tax avoidance.
23 Our results are robust to using the following alternative measures of accrual quality: 1)
natural log of the absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary accruals, as used
in  Ashbaugh,  LaFond,  and  Mayhew  (2003);  2)  income  tax  accrual  quality  based  on
Choudhary, Koester, and Shevlin (2015).
24 Gallemore and Labro (2015) label these measures as proxies for internal information
environment. Following prior studies (Hemmer and Labro 2008; Dichev, Graham, Harvey,
and  Rajgopal  2013),  they  argue  that  the  quality  of  the  firm’s  internal  information
environment is positively associated with the quality of the firm’s external information
environment.  Here,  we  examine  whether  the  firm’s  overall  information
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quality  accounting  system is  capable  of  integrating  information  across
different  parts  of  an  organization  and  thus  increasing  the  speed  with
which the books are closed and earnings are announced.  Prior work also
suggests  that  because  managers  need  good  internal  information
environment to forecast accurately (Gong, Li, and Xie 2009; Jennings et al.
2014),  the  quality  of  information  environment  is  higher  in  such
environments.  Based  on  H2c,  we  expect  higher  information  quality  to
improve investors’ ability to estimate variance and covariances of future
cash flows, and thus η to be negative in equation (3).
IV. RESULTS
Sample
The sample period for the current study spans from 1993-2010.25
We  collect  our  data  primarily  from  I/B/E/S,  Compustat,  and  CRSP  in
computing  the  cost  of  equity  capital,  tax  avoidance,  the  hypothesized
moderating  variables  and  the  control  variables  used  in  the  regression
analysis.  We exclude firms in the financial industries (SIC codes  6000 to
6999).  The  sample  size  varies  for  each  test  because  of  the  specific
measure used in  the test.  For  example,  sample size is  typically  larger
when tax avoidance is  measured by total  book-tax-difference (BTD)  or
permanent  book-tax  differences  (PBTD),  compared  to  long-run  cash
effective  tax  rates  (CETR)  because  of  the  more  stringent  five-year
requirement to compute the latter variable. Similarly, models using sales
quality/environment affects investors’ assessment of tax avoidance. Therefore, we do not
make a strong distinction between internal and external information environment in our
choice of empirical proxies.
25 Our sample  begins  in  1993 to  coincide  with the  implementation  of  FAS 109 (now
codified in ASC 740) to ensure consistent financial reporting for income taxes over the
sample period. 
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growth (SG) and financial constraints (DWW) as the moderating variables
have relatively larger sample size compared to models using dedicated
institutional  ownership  (DEDHELD)  or  management  forecast  accuracy
(MFACC), because these latter variables are available only for larger firms
and for firms that issue earnings forecasts, respectively. We also truncate
each  continuous  variable  at  the  1  percent  and  99  percent  levels  to
mitigate the effect of outliers. The final sample size used in the regression
analyses ranges from 5,610 to 26,781 firm-year observations for the 18-
year sample period.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the regression variables. The
mean  and  median  cost  of  equity  (R_PEG)  are  11.7  percent  and  10.5
percent,  respectively,  which are comparable to  those reported in  prior
studies  (e.g.,  Botosan  et  al.  2011).  The  mean  (median)  BTD is  0.012
(0.016),  which is  comparable to that  reported in  another large sample
study by Frank et al. (2009). The mean (median)  PBTD is 0.012 (0.007),
and the mean (median)  five-year  CETR is  32.2  percent  (30.7 percent),
where CETR is multiplied by negative one so that all three measures are
increasing in tax avoidance. The mean and median five-year cash effective
tax rate in our sample are higher than the 29.1 percent and 27.7 percent
reported in Dyreng et al. (2008). The difference is likely due to Dyreng et
al.’s  (2008)  sample  containing  larger  firms,  which  exhibit  lower  cash
effective tax rates. 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation table of the variables in our
analyses. The three measures of tax avoidance (BTD,  PBTD, and  CETR)
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are  positively  correlated,  consistent  with  each  capturing  tax  planning
activities. However, the correlations among the three measures, between
0.19  to  0.57,  suggest  that  each  measure  likely  captures  different
dimensions of tax avoidance. 
The  correlations  between  cost  of  equity  (R_PEG)  and  the  three
measures  of  tax  avoidance  (BTD,  PBTD,  and  CETR)  are  significantly
negative, which suggests that tax avoidance is associated with a lower
cost of equity. The correlation between cost of equity and other control
variables  is  also  largely  consistent  with  prior  literature  and  our
expectations. Recall that all right hand explanatory variables are lagged
one year relative to the R_PEG estimate. In particular, R_PEG is positively
correlated with beta (BETA), book-to market (BM), leverage (LEV), bid-ask
spreads  (SPREAD),  stock  return  volatility  ((RET)),  accounting
performance  volatility  ((EBITDA)),  and  analyst  forecast  bias  (FCBIAS),
and is  negatively  correlated with  firm size  (SIZE),  stock returns  (RET),
accounting performance (EBITDA) and accruals quality (AQ). 
Main Analysis – Test of H1
This section reports the results for the test of H1 which examines
the association between tax avoidance and cost of equity. As shown in
Table 4, all three of our measures of tax avoidance are negatively and
significantly associated with the cost of equity capital (t-statistic = -5.27, -
3.82, and -4.71 for BTD, PBTD, and CETR, respectively). The effect of tax
avoidance on cost of equity is also economically significant. Specifically, a
one standard deviation increase in book-tax difference (BTD), permanent
book-tax difference (PBTD), and cash-based effective tax rate (CETR) is
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associated with a 26 basis points, 13 basis points, and 19 basis points
decrease in the cost of equity, respectively.26 Because we explicitly control
for  the  business  fundamentals  (CAPEX,  R&D,  SGA,  FOREIGN,  TLCF and
TXBCO)  that  can  give  rise  to  the  transactions  underlying  these  tax
strategies, our results suggest that tax avoidance leads to a lower cost of
equity that is incremental to these business fundamentals.
The coefficients on the other control  variables are significant and
consistent with prior literature. In particular, we find that firms with higher
beta (BETA),  higher book-to-market (BM),  higher leverage (LEV),  higher
bid-ask  spread  (SPREAD),  higher  idiosyncratic  risks  ( (RET)),  higher
accounting performance volatility ((EBITDA)) and higher analyst forecast
bias (FCBIAS) are associated with a higher cost of equity while larger firms
(SIZE)  and  firms  with  higher  stock  returns  (RET),  better  accounting
performance  (EBITDA)  and  higher  accruals  quality  (AQ)  are  associated
with a lower cost of equity.
Overall,  the above results suggest that equity investors generally
require  a  lower  expected rate  of  return  due to  the  positive  cash  flow
effects of corporate tax avoidance. The next section explores the cross-
sectional  variation  in  the  relation  between  tax  avoidance  and  cost  of
equity.
Cross-sectional Analyses – Test of H2
H2a  examines  the  moderating  role  of  outside  monitoring.  In
26 Following prior studies (e.g., Hasan et al. 2014), we assess the economic significance
of  our  results  by  estimating  the  effect  of  a  one  standard  deviation  change  in  tax
avoidance on the cost of equity. For example, the impact of a one standard deviation
increase in total book-tax difference (BTD) on the cost of equity (R_PEG) is computed as -
0.029  (coefficient  on  BTD)  × 0.090 (the  sample  standard  deviation  of  BTD)  = -0.26
percent. 
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particular, we argue that stronger outside monitoring reduces managerial
opportunism associated with or masked by tax avoidance and hence the
negative association between firms’ tax avoidance and the cost of equity
capital should be stronger for firms with better outside monitoring. Table
5, Panel A uses analyst coverage (ANALYST) as a proxy for the extent of
outside  monitoring  and  Panel  B  uses  the  percentage  of  dedicated
institutional  ownership (DEDHELD)  as a proxy for the extent of  outside
monitoring.  Consistent  with  our  prediction  in  H2a,  the  negative
association between tax avoidance and cost of equity is stronger for firms
with  greater  analyst  following  and  for  firms  with  greater  dedicated
institutional  ownership,  except  when we  use  PBTD as  a  proxy  for  tax
avoidance. We also find that the coefficients on  ANALYST and  DEDHELD
are negative and mostly significant, which suggests that better outside
monitoring is associated with a lower cost of equity. The coefficient on
PBTD becomes  insignificant  when  we  include  the  interaction  with
DEDHELD (Panel B). Taken together, the results in Table 5 suggest that
investors require an even lower expected rate of return from tax avoiding
firms when these firms have better  outside  monitoring because better
outside monitoring likely mitigates managerial rent-diversion associated
with tax avoidance.
H2b  examines  the  moderating  role  of  marginal  benefits  of  tax
savings  and  predicts  the  negative  association  between  firms’  tax
avoidance and the cost of equity capital to be stronger for firms that likely
realize more benefits from a marginal dollar saved from taxes. Table 6,
Panel A uses sales growth (SG) as a proxy for the marginal benefits for tax
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savings and we expect firms with higher sales growth to realize greater
benefits from a marginal dollar saved because these tax savings can be
used to fund firm growth. Consistent with H2b, the negative association
between  tax  avoidance  and  cost  of  equity  is  stronger  for  firms  with
greater sales growth. Panel B uses the WW Index (DWW) as a proxy for
the marginal benefits for tax savings, where firms with greater financial
constraints  should  benefit  more  from incremental  tax  savings  because
these savings make it feasible to fund profitable investment opportunities.
Consistent with H2b, we find some evidence that the negative association
between  tax  avoidance  and  cost  of  equity  is  stronger  for  firms  with
greater financial constraints, except when we use CETR as a proxy for tax
avoidance.  The  coefficient  on  PBTD becomes  insignificant  when  we
include the interaction with DWW (Panel B). The results in Table 6 suggest
that  investors  recognize  how  tax  savings  can  be  redeployed  to  more
productive  uses  and  therefore  reward  tax-avoiding  firms  with  higher
marginal benefits from tax savings with a lower cost of equity.
Finally,  H2c examines the moderating role  of  information quality.
Higher information quality  can reduce investors’ information uncertainty
concerning the firm’s future cash flow in the form of  the variance and
covariances  of  expected  future  cash  flows,  and  hence  the  negative
association between firms’ tax avoidance and the cost of equity capital is
expected to be stronger for firms with higher information quality. Test in
Table  7,  Panel  A  uses  accrual  quality  (AQ)  based on the  Dechow and
Dichev  (2002)  as  a  proxy  for  information  quality,  with  higher  values
indicating higher information quality. Panel B uses the speed of earnings
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announcement (EASPEED) as a proxy for information quality, and Panel C
uses management forecast accuracy (MFACC) as a proxy for information
quality.  Consistent  with  H2c,  all  three  panels  show  that  the  negative
association between tax avoidance and cost of equity is stronger for firms
with  higher  information  quality.  In  addition,  the  coefficients  on  AQ,
EASPEED  and  MFACC are all negative and mostly significant, suggesting
that good information quality is associated with a lower cost of equity,
consistent with the findings in prior studies (e.g., Francis et al. 2005). Note
that the coefficient on BTD (PBTD) becomes insignificant when we include
the interaction with EASPEED in Panel B (MFACC in Panel C). In sum, the
results in Table 7 suggest that investors require an even lower expected
rate  of  return  from  tax  avoiding  firms  when  these  firms  have  higher
information  quality,  consistent  with  investors  being  better  able  to
estimate the variance and covariances of future cash flows relating to tax
planning.
This  section  finds  results  generally  consistent  with  our  cross-
sectional hypotheses that the negative association between tax avoidance
and  cost  of  equity  is  strengthened  with  stronger  outside  monitoring,
higher marginal benefits of tax savings, and higher information quality. 
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND SENSITIVITY CHECKS27
Change Analyses
In  our  earlier  analyses,  we  control  for  various  documented  risk
factors  that  could  potentially  correlate  with  both  our  measures  of  tax
27 All results discussed below and the related variable definitions are presented in detail
in an online appendix. The online appendix also contains a discussion and a comparison
of our results to a contemporaneous working paper by Hutchens and Rego (2015). 
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avoidance  and  the  cost  of  equity  to  mitigate  endogeneity  concerns,
including  market  risk,  and  business/transaction  fundamental  risk.  To
further mitigate the concern that an omitted correlated variable is driving
our  results,  we  utilize  a  change  regression  specification  for  our  main
analyses in an additional sensitivity test. We find that an increase in tax
avoidance is significantly associated with a decrease in the cost of equity.
We  also  re-run  our  cross-sectional  analyses  (H2)  using  a  change
specification. Despite the reduction in variation for the test of our cross-
sectional  analyses  based on a change specification,  we still  find some
evidence consistent with our cross-sectional hypotheses.
Using Alternative Dependent Variables
Alternative Measures of Cost of Equity Capital
We examine the robustness of  our results using three alternative
measures of cost of equity capital. The first two alternative measures are
proposed by Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and Botosan et al. (2011) as
appropriate measures because they correlate consistently and predictably
with various known proxies for risk.28 For the third alternative measure, we
use  an average ex-ante cost of equity measure based on the valuation
models from Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan
(2001),  Ohlson  and  Juettner-Nauroth  (2005),  and  Easton  (2004).  This
average  measure  has  been  used  extensively  in  the  literature  (e.g.,
Dhaliwal, Krull, and Li 2007).29 Our main inferences from earlier analyses
remain unchanged using these alternative measures of cost of equity.
28 These two alternative measures are based on the PEG ratio method and the target
price method (Botosan and Plumlee 2005). 
29 The computation and model-specific assumptions of the four valuation models used to
compute the average ex-ante cost of equity measure are outlined in the online appendix.
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Using Beta as the Proxy for Equity Risk
We recognize that in the Lambert et al. (2007) model, the cost of
equity  effect  is  fully  captured  by  an  appropriately  specified  forward-
looking beta, which suggests that we should model beta as the dependent
variable.  However,  because  we  empirically  measure  beta  based  on
historical returns that are unlikely to capture all information effects on the
forward-looking beta, we choose to focus on the implied cost of equity as
the dependent variable  instead of beta.  Our inferences are unchanged
using beta as an alternative equity risk variable.
Estimating Cost of Equity using Earnings Forecasts from a Cross-
sectional Model
Several  papers  call  into  question  the  validity  of  implied  cost  of
equity estimates due to optimistic biases in analyst forecasts for some
firms (Easton and Monahan 2005; Guay, Kothari, and Shu 2011).  Hou, van
Dijk,  and  Zhang  (2012)  generate  implied  cost  of  capital  estimates  by
replacing analyst forecasts with forecasts from a cross-sectional earnings
model and find their  resulting implied cost of  equity estimates reliably
predict future returns. In an additional robustness test, we re-estimate our
cost  of  equity  measure  (R_PEG)  using  inputs  from  the  cross-sectional
model following Hou et al. (2012). Our inferences are unchanged using an
alternative estimate of  earnings forecasts based on the cross-sectional
model.
Estimating  Cost  of  Equity  using  Expected  Returns  from Fama-
French Factor Model
In  an  additional  robustness  test,  we use  the  Fama-French  factor
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model  to  estimate  the  expected  (instead  of  implied)  cost  of  capital,
following the methodology used in Kothari, Li, and Short (2009) and Barth,
Konchitchki,  and Landsman (2013). In particular, we use the four-factor
(market factor, size factor, book-to-market factor and momentum factor)
expected  returns  as  an  alternative  measure  of  cost  of  equity.  Our
inferences  are  unchanged using an alternative  cost  of  equity  measure
based on expected returns from the Fama-French factor model.
Using Alternative Measures of Tax Avoidance
To  triangulate  our  inferences,  we  repeat  our  analyses  using
alternative measures of tax avoidance. We use two measures based on
GAAP effective  tax  rates  and another  measure  based on the one-year
measure of  cash effective tax rate. Our results are similar using these
three alternative measures of tax avoidance.
Tax shelters represent an extremely aggressive and risky form of
tax avoidance at  one end of  the continuum of  tax planning strategies
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Lisowsky et al. 2013). We use the tax shelter
prediction  score  based  on  Lisowsky  (2010),  and  the  predicted
unrecognized  tax  benefit  (UTB)  based  on  Lisowsky  et  al.  (2013).  We
conjecture that when a firm engages in risky tax activities, this can lead to
an increase in the variance and covariances of the firm’s cash flows which
could outweigh the increase in the firm’s expected future cash flows from
avoiding  tax  on  a  net  basis.  We  find  a  significantly  positive  relation
between  the  cost  of  equity  using  predicted  UTB  but  not  tax  shelter
prediction score.
Loss Firms
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As  a  final  robustness  check,  we  examine  whether  our  results  are
influenced by firms reporting losses because arguably firms with negative
taxable income have less incentive for  tax planning (e.g.,  Manzon and
Plesko  2002),  this  group  of  firms  should  possibly  be  excluded  for  our
robustness tests. Our results are also robust to excluding firms with either
a one-year, three-year or five-year cumulative negative taxable income
and negative pre-tax income.
VI. CONCLUSION
We use the Lambert et al. (2007) derivation of the cost of equity
capital to generate a testable hypothesis that relates tax avoidance to a
firm’s cost of equity capital. On the one hand, tax avoidance can produce
substantial  cash  tax-savings  (Dyreng  et  al.  2008),  which  increases
expected future cash flows and hence reduces the cost of equity capital.
On  the  other  hand,  tax  avoidance  can  increase  the  variance  and
covariances of the firm’s cash flows with the sum of all cash flows in the
market, thereby increasing the cost of equity capital. First, firm risk can
increase from the transactions or business fundamentals underlying these
tax  strategies,  such  as  foreign  operations,  research  and  development
activities and investments in intangibles. More aggressive tax strategies
such as transfer pricing may involve complex structuring of transactions,
which can increase the riskiness of the firm’s overall cash flows. Second,
equity holders are exposed to the risk of additional taxes, fines, interest
and penalties if the firm’s more aggressive tax avoidance activities are
deemed by the IRS and the tax courts to be noncompliant (Mills 1998;
Hanlon and Slemrod 2009). Finally, to the extent that there is a positive
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feedback effect between corporate tax avoidance and managerial actions
(Desai and Dharmapala 2006), equity holders are exposed to the agency
risk of increased managerial rent diversion, which increases the riskiness
of the firm’s cash flows to shareholders. 
We  utilize  three  broad  measures  of  tax  avoidance—book-tax
differences, permanent book-tax differences, and long-run cash effective
tax rates—to test our hypothesis and find that the cost of equity is lower
for  tax-avoiding  firms,  even  after  controlling  for  the  business
fundamentals underlying these tax savings transactions. To corroborate
our findings, and consistent with our predictions, we find that the positive
association between corporate tax avoidance and the cost of  equity is
stronger  for  firms  with  better  outside  monitoring,  for  firms  that  likely
realize  higher  marginal  benefits  from  tax  savings,  and  for  firms  with
higher information quality. In addition, our results are robust to using a
change specification, using three alternative measures of cost of equity,
beta  as  proxy  for  equity  risk,  earnings  forecast  from a cross-sectional
model to estimate cost of equity, estimating the cost of equity based on
expected  returns  from  the  Fama-French  factor  model,  and  three
alternative measures of tax avoidance.
This paper makes several novel contributions to the literature. It is
the  first  large-sample  study  that  directly  examines  the  association
between  cost  of  equity  and  corporate  tax  avoidance.  Earlier  papers
examine how investors value extreme forms of tax planning such as tax
sheltering and uncertain tax avoidance and the results are inconclusive
(Hanlon and Slemrod 2009, Wilson 2009; Koester 2013; Gallemore et al.
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2014; Hutchens and Rego 2015). However, tax sheltering and uncertain
tax positions are extremely aggressive tax planning activity (Hanlon and
Heitzman  2010;  Lisowsky  et  al.  2013),  and  hence  these  prior  studies
examining market response to these activities may not be generalizable
to  other  tax  planning  activities.  Our  study  extends  prior  literature  by
examining how broadly defined measures of tax avoidance, which include
the less aggressive tax planning methods, are associated with a firm’s
cost of equity. Our findings suggest that equity investors generally require
a lower expected rate of return due to the positive cash flow effects of
corporate tax avoidance. Our findings also potentially explain why many
large  U.S.  corporations  engage  in  tax  planning  and  why  corporations
provide incentives for managers to engage in tax planning (Robinson et al.
2010; Armstrong et al. 2012). 
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TABLE 1 
Definitions of Variables
R_PEG = Measure of cost of equity, based on Easton (2004):
RPEG=√eps2−eps1P0
where  eps2 (eps1)  refers  to  analysts’  forecast  of
two-year (one-year) ahead earnings and  P0 refers
to  current  stock  price.  Inputs  are  obtained  from
I/B/E/S  summary  statistics  and  prices  file  and
measured based on the first consensus analysts’
forecast available four months after the prior year
fiscal year end.
BTD = Total book-to-tax differences which is computed as
PI – (TXFED + TXFO)/STR, where PI refers to pretax
income,  TXFED  refers  to  current  federal  tax
expense,  TXFO  refers  to  current  foreign  tax
expense and STR refers to the statutory tax rate.
The  total  book-tax  difference  is  then  scaled  by
lagged total assets.
PBTD = Total  book-tax  differences  (BTD)  less  temporary
book-tax-differences  (TXDI/STR),  where  TXDI  is
total  deferred  tax  expense  and  STR  is  statutory
marginal  tax  rate.  The  permanent  book-tax
difference is then scaled by lagged total assets.
CETR = Five-year cumulative cash effective tax rate as in
Dyreng et  al.  (2008),  computed as  the five-year
sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by five-year
sum of pretax income (PI) less  special item (SPI).
The variable is multiplied by negative one so that
it is increasing in tax avoidance.
ANALYST = Natural log of number of analysts following a firm.
DEDHELD = Dedicated  institutional  ownership  as  defined  in
Bushee (1998) and used in Atkins et al. (2012).
SG = The change in sales (scaled by total assets) over
the prior fiscal year.
DWW = Indicator variable equals 1 if the Whited-Wu (WW)
index is in the top quartile, 0 otherwise. WW index
is measured by: 
WW = -0.091  × CF – 0.062  × DIVPOS +  0.021  ×
TLTD 
        – 0.044 × LNTA + 0.102 × ISG -  0.035 × SG, 
where  CF is the ratio of cash flow to total assets,
DIVPOS is an indicator that equals one if the firm
pays cash dividends, and zero otherwise,  TLTD is
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, LNTA is
the natural log of total assets, ISG is the firm’s 3-
digit industry sales growth,  SG is the firm’s sales
growth. 
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AQ = Accrual  quality  as in  Dechow and Dichev (2002)
and modified by McNichols (2002), defined as the
standard deviation of the residual over t+1 to t+4,
where the residual is estimated from the following
equation by industry (2-digit SIC) and year.
∆WC t=β0+β1CFOt−1+β2CFOt+β3CFOt+1+β4 ∆SALEt+β5PPEt
+εt
where ΔWC is changes in working capital scaled by
average  total  assets,  where  working  capital  is
Δaccount receivables (RECT) + Δinventory (INVT) -
Δaccount  payable  (AP)  -  Δtax  payable  (TXP)  +
Δother  current  asset  (ACO)  -  Δother  current
liabilities.  CFO  is  cash  flows  from  operation
(OANCF), ΔSALE is changes in sales (SALE) scaled
by average total assets, PPE is gross PP&E (PPEGT)
scaled  by  average  total  assets.  This  variable  is
multiplied by negative one so that it is increasing
in information quality.
EASPEED = Speed of earnings announcement, defined as the
number of days between the end of the fiscal year
and the firm’s earnings announcement, divided by
365. This variable is multiplied by negative one so
that it is increasing in information quality.
MFACC = Management  forecast  accuracy,  defined  as  the
absolute  value  of  the  difference  between
management’s  last  available  earnings  forecast
prior to fiscal year end and actual earnings. This
variable is multiplied by negative one so that it is
increasing  in  information  quality. Data  from
FirstCall CIG database.
BETA =
Beta estimated from CAPM model over the fiscal
year.
SIZE =
Natural log of market capitalization at fiscal year-
end.
BM =
Natural log of book-to-market ratio at fiscal year-
end.
LEV = Total debt to asset ratio at fiscal year-end.
SPREAD =
Roll’s  (1984)  effective  bid-ask  spreads  over  the
fiscal year.
RET = Stock returns over the fiscal year.
(RET)
=
Standard  deviation  of  monthly  stock  returns
measured over the fiscal year.
EBITDA = Accounting  performance,  proxied  by  earnings
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
for the fiscal year, scaled by lagged total assets.
(EBITDA) = Standard deviation of  EBITDA measured over the
prior  five  fiscal  years,  scaled  by  lagged  total
assets.
FCBIAS = Analysts’  forecast  bias,  defined  as  the  mean
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consensus analysts’ forecast of earnings per share
less the actual earnings per share, scaled by stock
price at the beginning of the fiscal year.
CAPEX = Capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets.
R&D = Research and development expenditures scaled by
lagged total assets.
SGA = Selling  and  general  expenses  scaled  by  lagged
total assets.
FOREIGN = An indicator equals one if the firm reports positive
foreign pre-tax earnings, and zero otherwise.
TLCF = An  indicator  equals  one  if  the  firm  reports  net
operating loss carryforwards, and zero otherwise.
TXBCO = An indicator equals one if the excess tax benefit of
stock  options  (TXBCOF)  is  non-zero,  zero
otherwise.
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Median Q1 Q3
Std.
Dev.
R_PEG 26,781 0.117 0.105 0.086 0.137 0.053
BTD 26,781 0.012 0.016 -0.009 0.041 0.090
PBTD 26,781 0.012 0.007 -0.003 0.024 0.095
CETR 22,576 -0.322 -0.307 -0.383 -0.216 0.189
ANALYST 23,111 1.677 1.792 1.099 2.398 0.946
DEDHELD 20,501 0.080 0.043 0.000 0.130 0.105
SG 26,771 -0.015 0.019 -0.085 0.077 0.256
DWW 26,766 0.254 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.435
AQ 26,781 -0.104 -0.058 -0.117 -0.032 0.126
EASPEED 26,481 -0.117 -0.110 -0.142 -0.079 0.052
MFACC 6,245 -0.009 -0.002 -0.006 0.001 0.041
BETA 26,781 1.122 1.003 0.609 1.494 0.758
SIZE 26,781 6.751 6.617 5.446 7.923 1.831
BM 26,781 -0.860 -0.793 -1.247 -0.405 0.706
LEV 26,781 0.212 0.202 0.049 0.334 0.170
SPREAD 26,781 0.014 0.008 0.002 0.019 0.019
RET 26,781 0.223 0.176 -0.055 0.433 0.486
σ(RET) 26,781 0.120 0.105 0.073 0.149 0.073
EBITDA 26,781 0.170 0.154 0.104 0.222 0.117
σ(EBITDA) 26,781 0.076 0.041 0.022 0.079 0.259
FCBIAS 26,781 -0.010 0.000 -0.004 0.009 0.161
CAPEX 26,781 0.077 0.052 0.029 0.092 0.096
R&D 26,781 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.072
SGA 26,781 0.285 0.233 0.096 0.407 0.261
FOREIGN 26,781 0.448 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.497
TLCF 26,781 0.309 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.462
TXBCO 26,781 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.253
The sample period used for the study spans from 1993-2010. The descriptive
statistics for all variables are based on the largest sample when tax avoidance is
measured by BTD. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Table
1.  All  continuous  variables  trimmed  at  the  1  and  99  percentiles.   For  the
regressions,  CETR is  multiplied  by  negative  one  so  that  all  tax  avoidance
measures are increasing in tax avoidance.
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TABLE 3 
Pearson Correlation Table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) R_PEG 1.00
(2) BTD -0.17 1.00
(3) PBTD -0.12 0.57 1.00
(4) CETR -0.12 0.37 0.19 1.00
(5) ANALYST -0.26 0.05 0.03 0.13 1.00
(6) DEDHELD 0.03
-
0.05
-
0.04
-
0.10 0.08 1.00
(7) SG -0.01
-
0.06
-
0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 1.00
(8) DWW 0.26
-
0.07 -0.01
-
0.04
-
0.40
-
0.06 0.00 1.00
(9) AQ -0.05 -0.00
-
0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.13 0.01
-
0.18 1.00
(10) EASPEED -0.17 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.38 0.11 0.00
-
0.21 0.11 1.00
(11) MFACC -0.15 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.01
-
0.08 0.01 0.10 1.00
(12) BETA 0.18
-
0.07 -0.01
-
0.02 0.07
-
0.04 0.00 0.14
-
0.24 0.01
-
0.08 1.00
(13) SIZE -0.39 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.67
-
0.03 -0.01
-
0.56 0.04 0.30 0.14
-
0.05 1.00
(14) BM 0.24
-
0.06
-
0.09
-
0.12
-
0.30 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.12
-
0.15
-
0.11
-
0.08
-
0.38 1.00
(15) LEV 0.05
-
0.04
-
0.08 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.01
-
0.24 0.19
-
0.07
-
0.06
-
0.20 0.07 0.08
(16) SPREAD 0.28
-
0.07
-
0.05
-
0.15
-
0.35 0.16 0.01 0.26 0.11
-
0.13
-
0.13
-
0.11
-
0.50 0.20
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(17) RET -0.07 0.09 0.10 0.03
-
0.06 -0.01
-
0.05 0.09
-
0.07 0.01
-
0.09 0.14 0.03
-
0.34
(18) σ(RET) 0.32
-
0.11
-
0.05
-
0.07
-
0.16 -0.07
-
0.02 0.29
-
0.16
-
0.11
-
0.18 0.41
-
0.30 0.00
(19) EBITDA -0.22 0.36 0.31 0.14 0.17 0.04
-
0.10
-
0.10 -0.00 0.11 0.11
-
0.08 0.17
-
0.39
(20) σ(EBITDA) 0.08 0.00 0.01
-
0.03
-
0.04 -0.01
-
0.02 0.13
-
0.14
-
0.03 -0.02 0.16
-
0.08
-
0.08
(21) FCBIAS 0.06
-
0.07
-
0.06 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00
-
0.03 0.03
(22) CAPEX 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.04
-
0.08
-
0.03 0.03
-
0.04 0.02
-
0.04 0.00
-
0.07
(23) R&D 0.09
-
0.14
-
0.03 0.00 0.05 0.01
-
0.03 0.22
-
0.19 0.12 0.01 0.30
-
0.02
-
0.26
(24) SGA 0.08
-
0.07 0.03
-
0.12
-
0.09 0.02
-
0.09 0.25
-
0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.14
-
0.20
-
0.24
(25) FOREIGN 0.00
-
0.04 0.00
-
0.04 0.17 0.01 0.00
-
0.11
-
0.04 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.22
-
0.10
(26) TLCF 0.08
-
0.04
-
0.02 0.03 0.01
-
0.09 0.01 0.04
-
0.14
-
0.05
-
0.04 0.15 0.03 0.00
(27) TXBCO -0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07
-
0.12 0.00 0.02
-
0.14 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.03
-
0.06
TABLE 3 (Cont’d)
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
(1) R_PEG
(2) BTD
(3) PBTD
(4) CETR
(5) ANALYST
(6) DEDHELD
(7) SG
(8) DWW
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(9) AQ
(10) EASPEED
(11) MFACC
(12) BETA
(13) SIZE
(14) BM
(15) LEV 1.00
(16) SPREAD 0.09 1.00
(17) RET -0.10 -0.01 1.00
(18) σ(RET) -0.11 0.13 0.37 1.00
(19) EBITDA -0.14 -0.07 0.14 -0.07 1.00
(20) σ(EBITDA) -0.10 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.03 1.00
(21) FCBIAS 0.03 0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 1.00
(22) CAPEX 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.01 1.00
(23) R&D -0.29 -0.02 0.14 0.23 0.02 0.15 -0.01 -0.07 1.00
(24) SGA -0.32 0.09 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.09 -0.02 -0.06 0.33 1.00
(25) FOREIGN -0.11 -0.16 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.15 0.19 0.05 1.00
(26) TLCF 0.00 -0.10 0.02 0.10 -0.13 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.11 0.02 0.21 1.00
(27) TXBCO -0.13 -0.16 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 1.00
This table reports the Pearson’s correlation between the variables used in the regression analysis, based on the largest
possible sample. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. CETR is multiplied by negative one so that
all tax avoidance measures are increasing in tax avoidance. All correlations that are bold are statistically significant at the
0.01 level or better (two-tailed).
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TABLE 4 
Tax Avoidance and Cost of Equity (H1)
TAX = BTD TAX = PBTD TAX = CETR
Exp.
Sign Coef. t-stat
Coef
. t-stat
Coef
. t-stat
Intercept
?
0.123
25.45**
*
0.12
2
25.35**
*
0.10
3
23.67**
*
TAX
-
-
0.029
-
5.27***
-
0.01
4
-
3.82***
-
0.01
0
-
4.71***
BETA
+
0.005 7.15***
0.00
5 7.11***
0.00
6 7.98***
SIZE
-
-
0.006
-
16.46**
*
-
0.00
6
-
16.32**
*
-
0.00
4
-
11.35**
*
BM
+
0.006 7.79***
0.00
6 7.59***
0.00
9
11.01**
*
LEV
+
0.036
13.23**
*
0.03
6
13.32**
*
0.03
4
12.57**
*
SPREAD
+
0.324 6.97***
0.32
4 6.92***
0.34
5 8.94***
RET
-
-
0.011
-
12.78**
*
-
0.01
1
-
13.32**
*
-
0.01
1
-
12.40**
*
σ(RET)
+
0.130
10.16**
*
0.13
3
10.33**
*
0.12
0 7.28***
EBITDA
-
-
0.054
-
11.30**
*
-
0.05
9
-
12.77**
*
-
0.03
3 -6.32***
σ(EBITDA)
+
0.005 2.92***
0.00
5 2.92***
0.01
0 2.25**
FCBIAS
+
0.009 3.14***
0.01
0 3.19***
0.00
9 3.01***
AQ
-
-
0.011
-
3.48***
-
0.01
1
-
3.50***
-
0.09
7 -6.23***
CAPEX
?
0.033 4.65***
0.03
3 4.68***
0.03
4 3.66***
R&D
?
0.033 4.57***
0.03
6 5.56***
0.04
6 5.70***
SGA
?
0.011 5.36***
0.01
2 5.84***
0.00
6 2.89***
FOREIGN
?
0.000 0.16
0.00
0 0.21
0.00
0 -0.56
TLCF
?
0.002 2.48**
0.00
2 2.41**
0.00
2 2.24**
TXBCO
?
-
0.003
-
2.98***
-
0.00
3
-
3.00***
-
0.00
1 -1.37
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 (%) 32.60 32.46 32.82
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N 26,781 26,781 22,576
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance
and the  cost  of  equity  capital.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  cost  of  equity
capital (R_PEG). The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1.
Column 1 shows the results using BTD to proxy tax avoidance, Column 2 shows
the results using PBTD to proxy tax avoidance, and Column 3 shows the results
using CETR to proxy tax avoidance. CETR is multiplied by negative one so that all
three tax avoidance measures are increasing in tax avoidance. Coefficients on
the year and industry dummies based on Fama and French 48 industries are not
tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by
firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 5
Tax Avoidance and Cost of Equity – the Role of Outside Monitoring
(H2a)
Panel A: Analyst coverage
TAX = BTD TAX = PBTD TAX = CETR
Exp.
Sign
Coef
. t-stat
Coef
. t-stat
Coef
. t-stat
Intercept
? 0.12
0
23.69**
*
0.12
0
23.51**
*
0.10
3
22.54**
*
TAX
- -
0.06
3
-
3.58***
-
0.04
0
-
4.29***
-
0.01
0 -4.55***
BETA
+ 0.00
5 7.22***
0.00
5 7.08***
0.00
6 8.04***
SIZE
- -
0.00
5
-
11.59**
*
-
0.00
5
-
11.49**
*
-
0.00
4 -8.67***
BM
+ 0.00
7 8.30***
0.00
7 8.00***
0.00
9
10.90**
*
LEV
+ 0.03
7
12.73**
*
0.03
7
12.79**
*
0.03
4
12.17**
*
SPREAD
+ 0.32
3 6.44***
0.32
7 6.32***
0.39
2 9.16***
RET
- -
0.01
0
-
11.42**
*
-
0.01
1
-
12.11**
*
-
0.01
0
-
11.86**
*
σ(RET)
+ 0.12
8 8.96***
0.13
1 9.17***
0.11
6 6.97***
EBITDA
- -
0.05
4
-
9.95***
-
0.05
9
-
11.77**
*
-
0.03
6 -7.20***
σ(EBITDA)
+ 0.00
5 2.40**
0.00
5 2.43**
0.00
9 2.22**
FCBIAS
+ 0.01
7 4.52***
0.01
8 4.63***
0.01
8 3.96***
AQ
- -
0.01
2
-
3.74***
-
0.01
3
-
3.77***
-
0.08
4 -5.09***
CAPEX
? 0.04
3 7.61***
0.04
2 7.50***
0.05
0 8.70***
R&D
? 0.03
5 4.93***
0.04
0 5.76***
0.04
8 5.90***
SGA
? 0.01
3 6.01***
0.01
4 6.29***
0.00
9 4.53***
FOREIGN
?
0.00
0 0.08
0.00
0 0.12
-
0.00
1 -1.12
TLCF
? 0.00
2 2.66***
0.00
2 2.58***
0.00
2 2.20**
TXBCO
? -
0.00
3 -2.39**
-
0.00
3 -2.39**
-
0.00
1 -0.91
ANALYST
- -
0.00
-
2.90***
-
0.00
-
2.85***
0.00
0 0.12
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2 2
TAX × 
ANALYST
- -
0.02
3
-
3.30***
-
0.01
8
-
3.98***
0.00
0
-
4.56***
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 (%) 33.07 32.89 31.75
N 23,111 23,111 21,413
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TABLE 5 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Dedicated institutional ownership
TAX = BTD TAX = PBTD TAX = CETR
Exp.
Sign
Coef
. t-stat
Coef
. t-stat
Coef
. t-stat
Intercept
? 0.12
0 21.36***
0.12
0
21.27**
*
0.10
2
19.22**
*
TAX
- -
0.02
4 -2.91***
-
0.00
5 -1.23
-
0.01
0 -2.65***
BETA
+ 0.00
4 6.12***
0.00
4 6.12***
0.00
6 6.96***
SIZE
- -
0.00
5
-
14.41***
-
0.00
5
-
14.24**
*
-
0.00
4
-
10.14**
*
BM
+ 0.00
7 7.50***
0.00
7 7.45***
0.01
0
10.90**
*
LEV
+ 0.03
5 11.72***
0.03
5
11.75**
*
0.03
6
11.70**
*
SPREAD
+ 0.31
5 6.55***
0.31
6 6.48***
0.35
8 8.29***
RET
- -
0.00
9 -9.80***
-
0.01
0
-
10.25**
*
-
0.01
0
-
11.02**
*
σ(RET)
+ 0.12
4 7.92***
0.12
6 8.02***
0.11
1 6.05***
EBITDA
- -
0.05
4
-
10.16**
*
-
0.05
8
-
11.09**
*
-
0.03
3
-
6.35**
*
σ(EBITDA)
+ 0.00
7 3.20***
0.00
7 3.20***
0.01
2 1.75*
FCBIAS
+ 0.00
9 2.86***
0.00
9 2.92***
0.00
9 2.35**
AQ
- -
0.01
3
-
3.73***
-
0.01
3
-
3.68***
-
0.09
7
-
5.47**
*
CAPEX
? 0.04
6 8.30***
0.04
4 7.95***
0.04
4
7.52**
*
R&D
? 0.04
4 5.25***
0.04
5 5.29***
0.04
5
5.16**
*
SGA
? 0.01
1 4.72***
0.01
2 5.10***
0.00
8
3.61**
*
FOREIGN
?
0.00
0 -0.19
0.00
0 -0.11
-
0.00
1 -0.99
TLCF
? 0.00
2 2.57***
0.00
2 2.47**
0.00
2 1.89*
TXBCO
? -
0.00
3
-
2.56***
-
0.00
3
-
2.61***
-
0.00
1 -0.60
DEDHELD
- -
0.00
7 -1.62
-
0.00
7 -1.57
-
0.02
6
-
2.64**
*
TAX × - - -2.00** - -1.21 - -
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DEDHELD
0.11
9
0.05
9
0.06
4 2.40**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 (%) 31.92 31.76 31.96
N 20,501 20,501 17,867
This table reports the regression results of the role of outside monitoring on the
relation between tax avoidance and the cost of equity capital. The dependent
variable is the cost of equity capital (R_PEG). In Panel A, we report the results
when outside monitoring is proxied by analyst coverage. In Panel B, we report
the results when outside monitoring is proxied by ownership held by dedicated
institutions.  The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. In
each  Panel,  Column 1  shows  the  results  using  BTD to  proxy  tax  avoidance,
Column 2 shows the results using PBTD to proxy tax  avoidance, and Column 3
shows  the results  using  CETR  to  proxy  tax  avoidance.  CETR is  multiplied  by
negative one so that  all  three tax  avoidance measures are  increasing in  tax
avoidance. Coefficients on the year and industry dummies based on Fama and
French 48 industries are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on
standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the
data.  ***,  **,  and  *  denote  significance  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%  levels,
respectively.
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TABLE 6
Tax Avoidance and Cost of Equity – the Role of Marginal Benefits
of Tax Savings (H2b)
Panel A: Sales growth
TAX = BTD TAX = PBTD TAX = CETR
Exp.
Sign
Coef
. t-stat
Coef
. t-stat
Coef
. t-stat
Intercept
? 0.12
4 25.61***
0.12
3 25.48***
0.10
4 24.25***
TAX
- -
0.03
4 -6.17***
-
0.02
0 -4.65***
-
0.01
0 -4.41***
BETA
+ 0.00
5 7.19***
0.00
5 7.13***
0.00
6 7.93***
SIZE
- -
0.00
6
-
16.46***
-
0.00
6
-
16.32***
-
0.00
4
-
11.10***
BM
+ 0.00
6 7.53***
0.00
6 7.43***
0.00
9 10.58***
LEV
+ 0.03
5 12.94***
0.03
6 13.04***
0.03
4 12.04***
SPREAD
+ 0.32
4 6.99***
0.32
5 6.94***
0.35
2 8.79***
RET
- -
0.01
1
-
12.74***
-
0.01
1
-
13.28***
-
0.01
1
-
12.52***
σ(RET)
+ 0.12
9 10.12***
0.13
3 10.30***
0.11
8 7.11***
EBITDA
- -
0.05
5
-
11.42***
-
0.05
9
-
12.29***
-
0.03
5 -6.49***
σ(EBITDA)
+ 0.00
4 2.61***
0.00
5 2.71***
0.01
0 2.21**
FCBIAS
+ 0.00
9 3.09***
0.00
9 3.13***
0.00
9 2.88***
AQ
- -
0.01
0 -3.31***
-
0.01
1 -3.35***
-
0.09
7 -5.97***
CAPEX
? 0.03
3 4.56***
0.03
2 4.60***
0.03
4 3.57***
R&D
? 0.03
1 4.34***
0.03
5 5.18***
0.04
3 5.30***
SGA
? 0.01
1 5.17***
0.01
1 5.51***
0.00
5 2.69***
FOREIGN
? 0.00
0 0.12
0.00
0 0.21
0.00
0 -0.52
TLCF
? 0.00
2 2.44**
0.00
2 2.35**
0.00
2 1.88*
TXBCO
? -
0.00
3 -2.98***
-
0.00
3 -3.01***
-
0.00
1 -1.39
SG
? -
0.00
4 -2.63***
-
0.00
4 -2.63***
-
0.01
0 -2.94***
TAX × SG
- -
0.03
2 -2.18**
-
0.02
0 -2.97***
-
0.01
7 -1.91*
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Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 (%) 32.67 32.52 33.06
N 26,771 26,771 21,920
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TABLE 6 (Cont’d)
Panel B: WW index
TAX = BTD TAX = PBTD TAX = CETR
Exp.
Sign
Coef
. t-stat
Coef
. t-stat
Coef
. t-stat
Intercept
? 0.11
3
23.45**
*
0.11
3
23.32**
*
0.10
1
21.49**
*
TAX
- -
0.02
1
-
3.85***
-
0.00
6 -1.26
-
0.00
9 -3.54***
BETA
+ 0.00
5 7.48***
0.00
5 7.32***
0.00
6 7.88***
SIZE
- -
0.00
5
-
13.49**
*
-
0.00
5
-
13.32**
*
-
0.00
3 -9.70***
BM
+ 0.00
7 8.90***
0.00
7 8.50***
0.00
9
11.25**
*
LEV
+ 0.03
9
14.34**
*
0.03
9
14.40**
*
0.03
6
13.11**
*
SPREAD
+ 0.30
6 7.27***
0.30
8 7.14***
0.33
8 8.72***
RET
- -
0.01
1
-
12.74**
*
-
0.01
1
-
13.42**
*
-
0.01
1
-
12.44**
*
σ(RET)
+ 0.12
6
10.12**
*
0.13
0
10.34**
*
0.12
1 7.32***
EBITDA
- -
0.05
0
-
10.58**
*
-
0.05
7
-
11.84**
*
-
0.03
0 -6.00***
σ(EBITDA)
+ 0.00
4 2.56***
0.00
5 2.65***
0.01
1 2.26**
FCBIAS
+ 0.00
9 3.09***
0.01
0 3.20***
0.01
0 3.16***
AQ
- -
0.01
0
-
3.21***
-
0.01
0
-
3.26***
-
0.02
2 -3.75***
CAPEX
? 0.03
3 4.63***
0.03
3 4.65***
0.03
3 3.66***
R&D
? 0.02
7 3.86***
0.03
4 4.97***
0.04
5 5.69***
SGA
? 0.01
1 5.23***
0.01
2 5.62***
0.00
6 3.06***
FOREIGN
? 0.00
0 0.47
0.00
0 0.48
0.00
0 -0.48
TLCF
? 0.00
2 2.58***
0.00
2 2.46**
0.00
2 2.34**
TXBCO
? -
0.00
3
-
2.73***
-
0.00
3
-
2.79***
-
0.00
2 -1.65*
DWW
+ 0.00
8 7.73***
0.00
8 7.55***
0.00
3 1.63
TAX × DWW
- -
0.03
3
-
3.26***
-
0.01
5 -2.14**
-
0.00
4 -0.98
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Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 (%) 32.90 32.69 32.61
N 26,766 26,766 22,621
This table reports the regression results of the role of marginal benefits of tax
savings on the relation between tax avoidance and the cost of equity capital. The
dependent variable is the cost of equity capital (R_PEG). In Panel A, we report the
results when the marginal benefit of tax savings is proxied by sales growth. In
Panel B, we report the results when the marginal benefit of tax savings is proxied
by financial constraints, WW index.  The detailed definitions of all variables are
provided in Table 1. In each Panel,  Column 1 shows the results using  BTD to
proxy  tax  avoidance,  Column  2  shows  the  results  using PBTD  to  proxy  tax
avoidance, and Column 3 shows the results using CETR to proxy tax avoidance.
CETR is multiplied by negative one so that all three tax avoidance measures are
increasing  in  tax  avoidance.  Coefficients  on  the  year  and  industry  dummies
based on Fama and French 48 industries are not tabulated for brevity. The  t-
statistics  are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control  for cross-
sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 7
Tax Avoidance and Cost of Equity – the Role of Information
Quality (H2c)
Panel A: Accrual quality
TAX = BTD TAX = PBTD TAX = CETR
Exp
.
Sig
n
Coef
. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Intercept
? 0.12
3
25.51**
* 0.123
25.37**
*
0.10
3
23.66**
*
TAX
- -
0.04
3 -6.12***
-
0.024 -3.99***
-
0.01
0 -4.78***
BETA
+ 0.00
5 7.17*** 0.005 7.10***
0.00
6 7.98***
SIZE
- -
0.00
6
-
16.47**
*
-
0.006
-
16.33**
*
-
0.00
4
-
11.35**
*
BM
+ 0.00
6 7.67*** 0.006 7.57***
0.00
9
11.00**
*
LEV
+ 0.03
5
13.10**
* 0.036
13.25**
*
0.03
4
12.56**
*
SPREAD
+ 0.32
3 7.01*** 0.324 6.94***
0.34
5 8.94***
RET
- -
0.01
1
-
12.71**
*
-
0.011
-
13.30**
*
-
0.01
1
-
12.40**
*
σ(RET)
+ 0.13
0
10.13**
* 0.133
10.32**
*
0.12
0 7.28***
EBITDA
- -
0.05
6
-
11.49**
*
-
0.059
-
12.82**
*
-
0.03
3 -6.32***
σ(EBITDA)
+ 0.00
5 2.79*** 0.005 2.92***
0.01
0 2.25**
FCBIAS
+ 0.01
0 3.18*** 0.010 3.19***
0.00
9 3.01***
CAPEX
? 0.03
4 4.70*** 0.033 4.69***
0.03
4 3.66***
R&D
? 0.02
9 4.17*** 0.035 5.43***
0.04
6 5.71***
SGA
? 0.01
2 5.59*** 0.012 5.87***
0.00
6 2.88***
FOREIGN
?
0.00
0 0.13 0.000 0.19
-
0.00
1 -0.56
TLCF
? 0.00
2 2.43** 0.002 2.41**
0.00
2 2.26**
TXBCO
? -
0.00
3 -3.04***
-
0.003 -3.04***
-
0.00
1 -1.37
AQ
- -
0.01
0 -3.03***
-
0.010 -3.13***
-
0.09
8 -6.26***
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TAX × AQ
- -
0.07
5
-
3.80***
-
0.05
1 -2.43**
-
0.00
1
-
4.03***
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 (%) 32.65 32.48 32.82
N 26,781 26,781 22,576
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TABLE 7 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Speed of earnings announcement (EASPEED)
TAX = BTD TAX = PBTD TAX = CETR
Exp
.
Sig
n
Coef
. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Intercept
? 0.11
1
22.80**
*
0.11
0 22.64***
0.09
8
21.07**
*
TAX
- -
0.00
4 -0.39
0.01
7 1.69*
-
0.01
1 -5.02***
BETA
+ 0.00
5 7.80***
0.00
5 7.77***
0.00
5 6.96***
SIZE
- -
0.00
5
-
15.07**
*
-
0.00
5
-
14.88***
-
0.00
4
-
10.34**
*
BM
+ 0.00
6 8.01***
0.00
6 7.79***
0.00
9
10.49**
*
LEV
+ 0.03
5
12.81**
*
0.03
5 12.87***
0.03
3
11.74**
*
SPREAD
+ 0.32
1 6.80***
0.32
1 6.76***
0.34
8 8.79***
RET
- -
0.01
0
-
12.54**
*
-
0.01
1
-
13.06***
-
0.01
1
-
12.17**
*
σ(RET)
+ 0.12
6 9.94***
0.12
9 10.09***
0.12
2 7.08***
EBITDA
- -
0.05
2
-
11.16**
*
-
0.05
8
-
12.52***
-
0.03
2 -6.10***
σ(EBITDA)
+ 0.00
5 2.79***
0.00
4 2.79***
0.02
1 1.60
FCBIAS
+ 0.01
0 3.35***
0.01
1 3.44***
0.01
0 3.04***
CAPEX
? 0.03
2 4.61***
0.03
1 4.63***
0.03
3 3.61***
R&D
? 0.03
9 5.10***
0.04
0 6.15***
0.05
3 6.31***
SGA
? 0.01
1 5.19***
0.01
2 5.69***
0.00
5 2.55***
FOREIGN
?
0.00
0 0.21
0.00
0 0.24
-
0.00
1 -0.71
TLCF
? 0.00
2 2.39**
0.00
2 2.30**
0.00
2 2.47**
TXBCO
? -
0.00
3
-
2.62***
-
0.00
3 -2.59***
-
0.00
1 -1.24
EASPEED
- -
0.05
2
-
5.87***
-
0.05
4 -6.06***
-
0.04
3 -4.58***
TAX × 
EASPEED
- -
0.18 -2.03**
-
0.24 -2.69***
-
0.00
-
11.31*
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5 0 1 **
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 (%) 32.94 32.82 32.85
N 26,481 26,481 21,678
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TABLE 7 (Cont’d)
Panel C: Management forecast accuracy (MFACC)
TAX = BTD TAX = PBTD TAX = CETR
Exp
.
Sig
n
Coef
. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Intercept
? 0.11
4
18.10**
*
0.11
3 17.98***
0.10
7
18.71**
*
TAX
- -
0.01
2 -1.51
-
0.00
1 -0.25
-
0.01
3
-
3.17***
BETA
+ 0.00
5 5.53***
0.00
5 5.48***
0.00
4 4.15***
SIZE
- -
0.00
4
-
9.55***
-
0.00
4 -9.46***
-
0.00
3
-
7.30***
BM
+ 0.00
5 4.41***
0.00
5 4.33***
0.00
7 5.36***
LEV
+ 0.02
6 7.07***
0.02
7 7.11***
0.02
8 6.99***
SPREAD
+ 0.68
0 5.44***
0.70
6 5.50***
0.61
9 4.36***
RET
- -
0.01
0
-
6.90***
-
0.01
0 -7.11***
-
0.00
9
-
6.31***
σ(RET)
+ 0.09
4 6.40***
0.09
8 6.46***
0.08
5 5.63***
EBITDA
- -
0.03
1
-
3.92***
-
0.03
6 -4.53***
-
0.03
4
-
3.91***
σ(EBITDA)
+ -
0.00
1 -0.44
0.00
0 -0.35
0.00
2 0.49
FCBIAS
+ 0.00
8 0.98
0.01
1 1.20
0.01
0 1.50
CAPEX
? 0.04
3 3.21***
0.04
2 3.07***
0.04
4 2.73***
R&D
? 0.02
0 1.77*
0.02
5 2.37**
0.04
3 2.97***
SGA
? 0.01
1 4.31***
0.01
2 4.51***
0.00
8 2.52***
FOREIGN
?
0.00
0 -0.02
0.00
0 0.01
-
0.00
3 -1.90*
TLCF
? 0.00
2 1.77*
0.00
2 1.66*
0.00
1 1.31
TXBCO
? -
0.00
1 -1.06
-
0.00
1 -1.12
0.00
0 -0.36
MFACC
- -
0.04
2 -1.68*
-
0.04
6 -1.44
-
0.08
1 -1.57
TAX × - - - - -1.81* - -2.36**
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MFACC
0.75
2
2.75**
*
0.27
8
0.14
9
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 (%) 36.27 35.99 34.75
N  6,245  6,245  5,610
This table reports the regression results of the role of information quality on the
relation between tax avoidance and the cost of equity capital. The dependent
variable is the cost of equity capital (R_PEG). In Panel A, we report the results
when the information quality is proxied by accrual quality. In Panel B, we report
the  results  when  the  information  quality  is  proxied  by  speed  of  earnings
announcement. In Panel C, we report the results when the information quality is
proxied  by  management  forecast  accuracy.  The  detailed  definitions  of  all
variables are provided in Table 1. In each Panel,  Column 1 shows the results
using  BTD to proxy tax  avoidance, Column 2 shows the results using PBTD  to
proxy tax  avoidance, and Column 3 shows the results using CETR to proxy tax
avoidance.  CETR is multiplied by negative one so that all three tax avoidance
measures are increasing in tax avoidance.  Coefficients on the year and industry
dummies based on Fama and French 48 industries dummies are not tabulated
for brevity.  The  t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to
control  for  cross-sectional  dependence  in  the  data.  ***,  **,  and  *  denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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